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RECONCEIVING INTERPRETIVE 
AUTONOMY: INSIGHTS FROM THE 
VIRGINIA AND KENTUCKY 
RESOLUTIONS* 
Wayne D. Moore** 
Judges are not the only constitutional decisionmakers in the 
United States. It is necessary, therefore, to move beyond wide-
spread preoccupation with the Constitution's judicial interpreta-
tion and enforcement. Judicial review is certainly an important 
practice in America, one closely identified with commitment to 
the rule of law. But excessive attention to issues surrounding ju-
dicial articulation of constitutional norms has obscured and dis-
torted analysis of other, equally fundamental components of 
American constitutionalism. A variety of political actors in addi-
tion to judges have had pivotal roles in creating, sustaining and 
enforcing the supreme law. 
Judges have, at times, been central players in conflicts over 
the character and scope of federal and state powers. From the 
late 1800s through 1937, for example, judges repeatedly invali-
dated exercises of national power in reliance on the Tenth 
Amendment's reservation of powers to the states.l Since the 
"constitutional revolution" surrounding the New Deal, however, 
judges and scholars have not typically regarded the Tenth 
Amendment as a formidable obstacle.2 Certainly there are good 
reasons for thinking about whether recent cases, such as New 
* Copyright © 1994 by Wayne D. Moore. All rights reserved. I am indebted to 
Christopher L. Eisgruber and Mark E. Brandon for comments and questions on drafts of 
this essay and to Walter F. Murphy, William F. Harris, II, and an anonymous reviewer for 
Princeton University Press for comments and questions on parts of a book manuscript 
from which this article derives. I am also grateful for opportunities to discuss issues 
raised by this piece with Karen M. Hult and Stephen K. White. I dedicate this article to 
the memory of my father, Maynard L. Moore, Jr. 
** J.D., University of Virginia School of Law, 1983; Ph.D., Politics, Princeton Uni-
versity, 1992; Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute and State University. 
1. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhan, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
2. See, e.g., Edward S. Corwin, Constitutional Revolution, Ltd. (Claremont Col-
leges Press, 1941), for a description of the central components of this "constitutional 
revolution." 
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York v. United States,3 might foreshadow renewed judicial con-
cern with limits on national authority;4 but it would be wrong to 
assume that principles of federalism, including important forms 
of state autonomy, depend primarily on how judges exercise their 
powers. 
The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799 
provide contexts for examining problems of constitutional mean-
ing and authority that are typically obscured by forms of analysis 
that center on the Constitution's judicial enforcement. The legis-
latures of two states passed resolutions that condemned the fed-
eral government's making and enforcing the Alien and Sedition 
Acts of 1798. These two states' actions raised serious questions 
about the character and reach of the United States Constitution 
and powers delegated by it, the location of sovereignty within 
America, arrangements of interpretive authority among institu-
tions of federal and state government, and relationships among 
powers of governmental officials and rights and powers of the 
people at large. 
The Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, along with drafts 
and responses to them, are especially valuable because they 
demonstrate how problems of interpretive authority cut across 
other forms of normative disagreement. Controversy over the 
Alien and Sedition Acts posed two main sets of constitutional 
issues: whether the Alien and Sedition Acts were valid, and 
whether efforts by two states to oppose them were valid. Much 
may be gained from paying attention not only to how various 
persons were interpreting the Constitution and what positions 
they took on these two issues, but also to whose positions were 
constitutionally authoritative. Accordingly, the focus of this es-
say is relationships among federal and state interpretive 
prerogatives. 
The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions were radical when 
written: They dealt with foundational issues of American consti-
tutionalism and called into question opposing conceptions of 
constitutional meaning and authority. Over the past two centu-
ries, these documents have become even more radical (or have 
3. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992). See also H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of 
Constitutional Law, 19 Va. L. Rev. 633, 689 (1993) (suggested, in the context of comment-
ing on New York v. United States, that principles and structures of federalism have "no 
legal substance" if not enforced by judges). 
4. A majority of the Supreme Court repudiated earlier efforts to revive principles 
of federalism, which culminated in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 
(1976), by reversing that precedent in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author-
ity, 469 u.s. 528 (1985). 
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become radical in a new way): They identify interpretive options 
that have become increasingly obscured by current ways of think-
ing. It is useful to consider seriously whether these radical per-
spectives warrant contemporary ratification as part of America's 
fundamental law. 
I. THREE FORMS OF PROTEST 
The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 resulted from, and ex-
acerbated, divisions between the Federalist and Republican par-
ties that formed during the Republic's early years.s John Adams, 
a leading Federalist, defeated Thomas Jefferson, a leading Re-
publican, in the presidential election of 1796. Jefferson became 
Vice President pursuant to electoral rules that were in effect at 
the time. 
In anticipation of a possible war with France, the predomi-
nantly Federalist Congress enacted four laws in 1798, known 
popularly as the Alien and Sedition Acts. Two of these were es-
pecially controversial: the Alien Friends Law ("An Act concern-
ing Aliens"), which allowed the President to order deportation of 
aliens; and the Sedition Law, which made seditious libel a crimi-
nal offense. The latter was directed primarily toward Republican 
critics of the Federalist administration. (Federalists sought to 
characterize the Republicans as sympathetic with the French and 
with movements underlying the 1789 French Revolution.) Fed-
eral judges, who were also predominantly Federalist, were more 
than willing to enforce the acts, particularly against Republicans 
and their alien allies. 6 
5. See Kenneth R. Bowling, Politics in the First Congress, 1789-1791 (Garland Pub-
lishing, Inc., 1990), for an examination of the historical origins of the Federalist and Re-
publican parties, including their relationships to divisions between the Federalists and 
Anti-Federalists of the 1780's. 
6. Except where otherwise specified, the remainder of this essay refers to the Alien 
Friends Act and the Sedition Law as "the Alien and Sedition Acts." James Morton 
Smith, Freedom's Fetters: The Alien and Sedition Laws and American Civil Liberties (Cor-
nell U. Press, 1956), reprints these acts and gives an account of the historical circum-
stances surrounding their adoption and enforcement, along with similar information on 
the Naturalization Act and the Alien Enemies Law of 1798. For other historical analyses 
of the Alien and Sedition Acts and their enforcement, see also Walter Berns, Freedom of 
the Press and the Alien and Sedition Laws: A Reappraisal, 1970 Sup. Ct. Rev. 109 (1970); 
Adrienne Koch and Harry Ammon, The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions: An Episode 
in Jefferson's and Madison's Defense of Civil Liberties, 5 Wm. & Mary Q. (3rd. ser.) 145 
(1948); John C. Miller, Crisis in Freedom: The Alien and Sedition AcL!' (Little, Brown & 
Co., 1951); Nathan Schachner, 2 Thomas Jefferson: A Biography ch. 43 (Appleton-Cen-
tury-Crofts, Inc., 1951); Stephen B. Presser, The Original Misunderstanding: The English, 
the Americans and the Dialectic of Federalist Jurisprudence chs. 7 & 8 (Carolina Academic 
Press, 1991); Ethelbert D. Warfield, The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798: An Historical 
Study (G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1894). 
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Jefferson was in a peculiar predicament. He opposed the 
laws and their enforcement, but he was not in a good position to 
challenge federal authority openly. The Vice President thus 
turned to one of the "external" checks contemplated by the au-
thors of The Federalist Papers: state legislatures.? He secretly 
drafted a set of resolutions for adoption by the North Carolina 
legislature, which he sought to use as a vehicle for voicing oppo-
sition to the Alien and Sedition Acts. 
Jefferson's messenger, Wilson Cary Nicholas, apparently 
gave the draft to John Breckinridge of Kentucky for considera-
tion by that state's legislature instead of North Carolina's. The 
Kentucky legislature approved some but not all of the resolutions 
in Jefferson's draft. (The draft, though written for adoption by 
North Carolina's legislature, is now generally identified as Jeffer-
son's draft of the Kentucky Resolutions.) As approved, the Ken-
tucky Resolutions of 1798 took a more modest position than 
Jefferson's draft on the state legislature's powers of protest. 
The same year, 1798, Virginia's legislature approved resolu-
tions that had been drafted by Madison, who had joined Jeffer-
son in opposing the Federalists (with many of whom, ironically, 
Madison had been allied in debates over the Constitution's ratifi-
cation). In addition, the following year, 1799, the Kentucky legis-
lature endorsed a variation of the stronger claims of state 
authority that had been in Jefferson's draft but deleted from the 
resolutions approved by that state's legislature in 1798. These 
various drafts, along with responses to them and subsequent 
analyses, identify at least three forms of state protest against fed-
eral governmental actions: nullification, reversal, and interposi-
tion. I deal with each in turn.s 
7. See notes 22, 50-52 & 56-57, infra, and the accompanying text. John C. Calhoun 
adopted a similar strategy to oppose tariffs when he was Vice President under Andrew 
Jackson. See William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Controversy in 
South Carolina, 1816-1836 154-73 (Harper & Row, 1966). 
8. Jefferson wrote two drafts of the resolutions, both of which are reprinted in Paul 
L. Ford, ed., 7 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 289-309 (G.P. Putnam's Sons, 10 vols., 1892-
99), along with a facsimile of the resolutions approved by the Kentucky legislature in 
1798. The "fair" copy to which this essay refers is also reprinted in Merrill D. Peterson, 
ed., The Portable Thomas Jefferson 281-89 (Viking Press, 1975). The Kentucky Resolu-
tions of 1798 and 1799, as approved, are reprinted in Jonathan Elliot, ed., 4 Debates in the 
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, as Recommended 
by the General Convention at Philadelphia, in 1787 at 540-45 (J.B. Lippincott & Co., 2nd 
ed., 1888) ("Debates"), except that Elliot omitted the phrase, "its co-states forming, as to 
itself, the other party," from paragraph 1 of his reprint of the Resolutions of 1798. The 
Virginia Resolutions, which were almost identical to a draft prepared by Madison, are 
reprinted in 17 Papers of James Madison 188-90 (U. Chi. Press, vols. 1-10, 1962-77; and U. 
Press of Va., vols. 11-17, 1977-92); and in Gaillard Hunt, ed., 6 Writings of James Madison 
326-31 (G.P. Putnam's Sons, 9 vols., 1900-10); and 4 Debates at 528-29. 
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A 
In his draft of the Kentucky Resolutions, Jefferson claimed 
that the states had authority to nullify acts of Congress, at least 
for some purposes and in some contexts, whether or not the 
Supreme Court concurred that the acts were unconstitutional. 
He distinguished "cases of an abuse of the delegated powers" 
from cases in which "powers are assumed which have not been 
delegated." Apparently referring to federal electoral processes, 
he claimed that a "change by the people" was the "constitutional 
remedy" for the former abuse. But his resolutions declared that 
if the federal government usurped powers other than those dele-
gated to it by the Constitution, "a nullification of the act [was] 
the rightful remedy."9 
Jefferson's position on interpretive authority, therefore, par-
alleled his conception of constitutional boundaries. He charac-
terized the Constitution as a "compact" among "the several 
States composing the United States of America." He claimed 
that the states "constituted a general government for special pur-
poses" and "delegated to that government certain definite pow-
ers." Accordingly, he argued that "whensoever the general 
government assumes undelegated powers, its acts are unauthori-
tative, void, and of no force."to 
Jefferson ran together his analysis of the states' and the peo-
ple's prerogatives. Part of this imprecision may be attributed to 
the fact that his principal objective was to articulate bounds of 
federal power rather than to distinguish the people's rights from 
state powers. He placed the people and the states on the same 
side of the boundary that most concerned him. In addition, he 
assumed that institutions of state government were accountable 
to the states' citizens, had primary responsibility to secure rights 
over which the federal government had no power, and were au-
thorized to voice the people's collective determinations.n 
9. Jefferson's draft of the Kentucky Resolutions (Nov. 1798), reprinted in 7 Writ-
ings of Thomas Jefferson at 301 (cited in note 8). 
10. ld. at 289-91. 
11. For example, Jefferson argued in reliance on the Tenth Amendment that be-
cause "no power over the freedom of religion, freedom of speech, or freedom of the press 
[was] delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, all lawful powers respecting the same did of right remain, and were reserved to the 
States or the people." Similarly, he cited the First Amendment and claimed that because 
"libels, falsehood, and defamation, equally with heresy and false religion, are withheld 
from the cognizance of federal tribunals," the states and the people "retain to themselves 
the right of judging how far the licentiousness of speech and of the press may be abridged 
without lessening their useful freedom, and how far those abuses which cannot be sepa-
rated from their use should be tolerated, rather than the use be destroyed." He elabo-
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Jefferson argued that unless the states had authority to "nul-
lify" the federal government's assumptions of undelegated 
power, the states and their residents "would be under the domin-
ion, absolute and unlimited, of whosoever might exercise this 
right of judgment for them." He asserted that Congress could 
not have this authority because it was "not a party, but merely 
the creature of the compact." Similarly, he characterized federal 
courts as part of "the government created by this compact." He 
claimed that no part of this government could be "the exclusive 
or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to itself; since 
that would have made its discretion, and not the Constitution, 
the measure of its powers." On the other hand, he argued that 
the states alone were "parties to the compact.'' In the absence of 
a "common judge," he submitted, the states were "solely author-
ized to judge in the last resort of the powers exercised under (the 
Constitution]. "1z 
Jefferson equivocated on whether each state had authority to 
nullify as ultra vires actions by the federal government or 
whether the states could only do so collectively. Suggesting the 
former but referring to the states plurally, he argued: "(E]very 
State has a natural right in cases not within the compact, (casus 
non foederis,) to nullify of their own authority all assumptions of 
power by others within their limits. "13 The draft provided that it 
would "nevertheless" be communicated from one state to its "co-
States" out of "regard and respect." Furthermore, the resolu-
tions sought the other states' "concur[rence) in declaring these 
rated on his reference to "themselves" in the context of discussing powers over religion. 
He referred to the people of the states, acting through their legislatures and/or limiting 
them, and declared that "they guarded against all abridgment by the United States of the 
freedom of religious opinions and exercises, and retained to themselves the right of pro-
tecting the same, as this State, by a law passed on the general demand of its citizens, had 
already protected them from all human restraint or interference." ld. at 294-95 (empha-
sis added). Compare Koch and Ammon, 5 Wm. & Mary Q. (cited in note 6) (underscored 
linkages among state prerogatives and those of the people at large). 
But see Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, (Oxford U. Press, 1985), for an 
argument that the main concern of those opposed to the Alien and Sedition Acts, at least 
initially, was to resist encroachment on state prerogatives rather than retained rights. 
Walter Berns, 1970 Sup. Ct. Rev. (cited in note 6), placed even greater emphasis on issues 
of federalism. (Although Berns linked Jefferson's position on state independence to his 
arguments concerning the nature of the federal compact, these arguments were concep-
tually distinct. Jefferson's claim of limited federal powers did not depend on an assump-
tion that the federal government had no powers that could preempt separate 
determinations by states and the people-i.e., in cases of the federal government's acting 
within delegated authority. In addition, issues of state authority and the people's rights 
overlapped more than Berns conceded.) 
12. 7 Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 291-92, 301-02 (cited in note 8). 
13. Id. at 301 (emphasis added). As explained below, this provision was deleted by 
the Kentucky legislature in 1798 but then affirmed in 1799. 
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acts void, and of no force." Jefferson attached importance to col-
lective action by the states, but anticipated that each state could 
legitimately "take measures of its own for providing that neither 
these acts, nor any others of the General Government not plainly 
and intentionally authorized by the Constitution, shall be exer-
cised within their respective territories."t4 
Although Madison later argued that Jefferson had not 
claimed that a single state could unilaterally nullify a congres-
sional enactment,t5 his draft of the Kentucky Resolutions leaves 
little doubt that he was taking a position that the states collec-
tively had authority to take such an action.16 Furthermore, at a 
time when the Union depended heavily on cooperation by state 
governments for enforcing federal laws, Jefferson apparently 
contemplated disregard by state officials of the Alien and Sedi-
tion Acts.17 In sum, he sanctioned independent action by the 
states based in part on the state legislature's interpretation of its 
reserved prerogatives. 
B 
As indicated above, the Kentucky legislature adopted two 
versions of Jefferson's draft. The initial version, the Kentucky 
Resolutions of 1798, made two significant changes to Jefferson's 
draft. First, the Resolutions of 1798 did not claim that the states 
had authority, either separately or collectively, to nullify congres-
sional enactments. The legislature eventually embraced Jeffer-
14. ld. at 301, 306. 
15. James Madison, Letter to __ Townsend, October 18, 1831, reprinted in 4 
Letters and Other Writings of James Madison at 198-200 (J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1865). 
16. See Koch and Ammon, 5 Wm. & Mary Q. (cited in note 6); Schachner, Thomas 
Jefferson: A Biography (cited in note 6). 
17. It is not clear whether Jefferson also approved more direct forms of interference 
with the laws' enforcement such as releasing prisoners from jails. (Compare later contro-
versies over extradition or rendition of slaves or other persons charged with breaking 
fugitive slave laws.) According to Warfield, there was not a single prosecution in Ken-
tucky under the Alien and Sedition Acts, and "[t]he situation in Virginia, though differ-
ent, was never serious enough to lead to any thing like organized resistance. Indeed, it is 
now impossible to decide just how far and in just what form resistance was contemplated 
by these Resolutions." Warfield, The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798: An Historical Study 
at 110 (cited in note 6). See also Jefferson's letter to Wilson C. Nicholas of August 23, 
1799, in which Jefferson affirmed the importance of the principles involved, considered 
possible forms of resistance, and indicated that he wished to preserve as many options as 
possible-to be able to do "whatever we might now rightfully do." The letter is reprinted 
in 7 Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 389-92 (cited in note 8). For analyses of patterns of 
federal enforcement of the Alien and Sedition Acts, see Frank M. Anderson, The En-
forcement of the Alien and Sedition Laws, Annual Repon of the American Historical Asso-
ciation for 1912 at 115-26 (Washington, D.C., 1914); Smith, Freedom's Fetters: The Alien 
and Sedition Laws and American Civil Liberties cbs. 9-17, esp. ch. 15 (cited in note 6) (on 
enforcement of the Sedition Act in Virginia). 
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son's position, however, in a second set of resolutions that were 
adopted in 1799. I discuss this reversal more thoroughly below. 
Second, the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 were submitted 
to the state's Senators and Representatives in Congress, and 
other states were requested to "unite with this commonwealth in 
requesting the[ ] repeal at the next session of Congress" of the 
"unconstitutional and obnoxious acts." (Jefferson's draft had not 
been addressed to Congress. He claimed it was only proper for 
the states to communicate with one another, "they alone being 
parties to the compact.") Whereas Jefferson had presumed that 
the states could nullify unconstitutional laws on their own au-
thority, the Kentucky legislature initially placed greater reliance 
on established federal structures such as repeal by Congress or a 
declaration of unconstitutionality by the United States Supreme 
Court.ts 
The Resolutions of 1798 were a type of communication, or 
petition. They functioned, among other things, to communicate 
the state's purported determination that the Alien and Sedition 
Acts were unconstitutional. The Resolutions did not, however, 
claim to oblige the state's representatives in Congress to vote for 
repeal of the acts.t9 Instead, the state legislature "enjoined" the 
state's Senators and Congressmen to "use their best endeavors" 
to procure a repeal of the "unconstitutional and obnoxious 
acts."zo 
The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 were nevertheless signifi-
cant, because they asserted the state's interpretive independence. 
The Resolutions did not presuppose that Congress or the 
Supreme Court had preclusive interpretive authority on issues of 
constitutional meaning. Instead, the Resolutions included a pro-
vision from Jefferson's draft that asserted each state's authority 
to "judge for itself" both whether the federal government had 
exceeded its legitimate powers and how to remedy any such 
infraction. 
18. Kentucky Resolutions (Nov. 10, 1798), reprinted in 4 Debates at 542-44. 
19. Compare debates in the First Congress over whether to add to the First Amend-
ment's precursor a declaration that the people had a right "to instruct their Representa-
tives." See 1 Annals of Congress 733 (Aug. 15, 1789) (Gales and Seaton ed., 1834). This 
proposal sparked more controversy, measured by the volume of discussion reported in 
the Annals, than any other single provision. The Journal of the Senate for September 3, 
1789 (volume 1, at 117) indicates that a similar motion was made and rejected in the 
Senate on September 3, 1789, but there are no records of the Senate's debates or other 
proceedings on this matter. These proposals had broad importance: whether constituents 
had a constitutional right or power, through instructions, to preempt or otherwise con-
strain choices by governmental officials-including official positions on issues of constitu-
tional interpretation. 
20. 4 Debates at 542. 
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Under the circumstances, the Kentucky legislators appar-
ently thought the most appropriate remedy was congressional re-
peal rather than formal state nullification.21 The legislators 
sought to influence all of the state's representatives: those se-
lected by the state legislature and those elected by the people 
directly. The legislature acted on its own behalf by enjoining the 
state's Senators to represent the legislature's considered position 
and acted on behalf of the people of the state in taking a similar 
position vis-a-vis members of the House of Representatives. 
Madison and Hamilton had contemplated both possibilities in 
The Federalist: state legislatures acting as representatives on be-
half of the states as such and on behalf of their citizens.22 
The Kentucky legislature's position was partially vindicated. 
Although Congress did not repeal any of the acts, the Alien 
Friends Act and the Sedition Act expired according to their 
terms in 1800 and 1801, respectively. The immediate crisis with 
France passed; and after the Republicans' electoral successes in 
1800, the Federalists had no interest in renewing the Sedition 
Act. The Naturalization Act and the Alien Enemies Act re-
mained in effect, but they had not been the main objects of Re-
publican opposition. 
Before the two objectionable acts expired, however, a ma-
jority of the other states criticized the Kentucky Resolutions of 
1798 and Madison's "Virginia Resolutions." At issue was the 
states' powers of protest, not just the validity of the acts in ques-
tion. Thus it is important to consider whether the Resolutions of 
1798 had any intrinsic effects, independent of subsequent action 
or inaction by other states or by federal officials. 
The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 were unclear on what 
formal effect, if any, the state's declaration of unconstitutionality 
purported to have. Was it only (though significantly) a public 
21. For accounts of changes to Jeffersou 's draft, the introduction of revised resolu-
tions, and their adoption by the Kentucky legislature, see Edward Channing, Kentucky 
Resolutions of 1798,20 Am. Hist. Rev. 333 (1915); Koch and Ammon, 5 Wm. & Mary Q. 
at 156-58 (cited in note 6); Schachner, 2 Thomas Jefferson: A Biography, at 615-16 (cited 
in note 6); and Berns, 1970 Sup. Ct. Rev. at 127-28 (cited in note 6). From the sources I 
have reviewed, there appears to be no conclusive evidence that Breckinridge made the 
changes to Jefferson's draft, although Schachner and Berns reasonably assumed that he 
had a major role in making such changes. Moreover, Schachner's work refers to evidence 
that Breckinridge thought "the several States" had authority to nullify the Alien and Se-
dition Acts "[i]f, upon representations of the States from whom they derive their powers, 
(Congress] should nevertheless attempt to enforce (the acts]." The idea of exhausting 
constitutional means would have been attractive to members of the Kentucky legislature, 
whether or not at the behest of Breckinridge. 
22. Compare, e.g., Madison's arguments in The Federalist Nos. 44, 45, 46, and 51; 
and Hamilton's arguments in The Federalist Nos. 26, 28, 32, 33, and 60. 
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utterance, or type of petition, designed to influence Kentucky's 
co-states and their federal representatives? Or did it also author-
ize state officials to ignore the laws or interfere more actively 
with their enforcement? Did the declaration authorize the state's 
residents to disobey the laws? Did it have any other legal effects, 
short of formal nullification? For all practical purposes, did it 
even nullify the acts, or suspend their enforceability within the 
state, notwithstanding the omission of an explicit claim to do so? 
The Kentucky legislature finessed these questions in 1798 by 
relying directly on Jefferson's idea that the Alien and Sedition 
Acts were "not law" and thus were "altogether void, and of no 
force. "23 This position rested on a premise that the Constitution 
had meaning independent of any person's or institution's inter-
pretations of it. If the acts of Congress were not enacted in pur-
suance of the Constitution, they were not valid, measured by the 
criteria set forth in the constitutional text itself. 
According to this line of reasoning, the Alien and Sedition 
Acts were void and unenforceable even if the state legislature did 
not formally nullify them or Congress did not repeal them. In 
1798, the state officials were apparently unsure of whether they 
had authority to nullify the acts, and for practical reasons the 
legislators favored repeal. But they did not make their declara-
tion of unconstitutionality dependent on any such future actions. 
Furthermore, the legislators evidently thought the state had justi-
fication, whether based on the Kentucky Resolutions or other-
wise, to oppose enforcement of the laws within the state's 
borders. 
This position raised but did not resolve important practical 
dilemmas. Assuming the Alien and Sedition Acts were unconsti-
tutional and thus void and unenforceable even absent their for-
mal nullification, what was the "supreme law of the land" in this 
context? How could persons ascertain the requirements of 
"supreme law" for purposes of guiding their behavior if the Con-
stitution's meaning transcended any particular person's or insti-
tution's interpretations of the law? Did each person have 
constitutional authority to act based on his or her analyses of 
constitutional meanings and their implications in particular cir-
cumstances? Alternatively, did the Constitution give govern-
mental officials some sort of final authority to resolve 
interpretive disputes at least pending formal reconsideration of 
such decisions or change in the law? What recourse did states 
and their residents have if federal officials used institutions of 
23. 4 Debates at 540-41. 
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collective power to enforce what may have been an unconstitu-
tional law?24 
Other states' responses to the Kentucky and Virginia Reso-
lutions of 1798 and Madison's defense of the latter resolutions 
against the other states' criticisms shed light on these issues. 
These materials also provide criteria for evaluating some of the 
differences between Jefferson's draft and the Kentucky Resolu-
tions of 1798 (or, what amounts to much the same thing, differ-
ences between the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799). 
Moreover, the Virginia Resolutions and Madison's defense of 
them presented intermediate positions on several issues of con-
stitutional resistance, thus providing a third model that is worth 
considering along with the stronger and weaker versions of the 
Kentucky Resolutions. 
c 
Madison expressed to Jefferson some important concerns 
about whether state legislatures had authority to nullify federal 
legislation. Madison wrote to his friend and mentor: 
Have you ever considered thoroughly the distinction between 
the power of the State, & that of the Legislature, on questions 
relating to the federal pact. On the supposition that the for-
mer is clearly the ultimate Judge of infractions, it does not fol-
low that the latter is the legitimate organ especially as a 
Convention was the organ by which the Compact was made.zs 
Madison sought to protect himself against this same criticism in 
his draft of resolutions for adoption by the Virginia legislature: 
This was a reason of great weight for using general expressions 
that would leave to other States a choice of all the modes pos-
sible of concurring in the substance, and would shield the 
Genl. Assembly (of Virginia] agst. the charge of Usurpation in 
the very act of protesting agst. the usurpations of Congress.26 
The Virginia Resolutions appealed to "the like disposition of the 
other States, in confidence that they will concur with this Com-
24. Compare Sanford Levinson's discussion of "protestant" and "catholic" concep-
tions of the Constitution's arrangement of interpretive authority in Sanford Levinson, 
Constitutional Faith ch. 1 (Princeton U. Press, 1988). 
25. James Madison, Letter to Thomas Jefferson, December 29, 1798, reprinted in 17 
Papers of James Madison at 191-92 (cited in note 8) (emphasis in original). Madison was 
apparently responding to Jefferson's criticism of his draft, which is cited in note 29. 
26. ld. 
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monwealth in declaring, as it does hereby declare, that the [Alien 
and Sedition] acts ... are unconstitutional."27 
Madison drafted the Virginia Resolutions for adoption by 
the state's legislature rather than a state convention. He pre-
sumed, as had Jefferson, that state legislatures could speak on 
behalf of the respective states. But in place of Jefferson's claims 
of state authority to "nullify" the federal laws, Madison used the 
rhetoric of "interposition." The resolutions "interposed" the 
state's authority, expressed by its legislature, between the people 
of the state, on the one hand, and the federal government, on the 
other. In this manner, he apparently sought to ground the legis-
lature's opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts more solidly in 
the authority of the people of the state. 
Although he left open the possibility that the states might 
have had collective nullifying authority, he concentrated on less 
extraordinary measures. The Virginia Resolutions had four main 
components. First, the legislature "declare[d]" the Alien and Se-
dition Acts "unconstitutional. "zs Apparently at Jefferson's urg-
ing, a draft of the Resolutions also declared the acts "not law, but 
utterly null, void and of no force or effect."29 The legislature 
struck those words, making the final Resolutions silent on 
whether the federal laws continued in effect or were void based 
on constitutional standards alone. 
Second, the Virginia Resolutions declared that the state 
would take "necessary and proper" measures to "maintain[ ] 
27. Virginia Resolutions (December 21, 1798), reprinted in id. at 188, 190. The Vir-
ginia Resolutions provided that a copy of the document be transmitted to "the Executive 
authority of each of the other States, with a request that the same may be communicated 
to the Legislature thereof." Id. at 190. Jefferson's draft of the Kentucky Resolutions was 
comparable on these issues. It provided for transmission of the resolutions by a confer-
ence committee to "the Legislatures of the several States" but also invited the "co-States" 
(not their legislatures) to concur in Kentucky's declaration of unconstitutionality. See 7 
Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 300, 301-02, 305-06 (cited in note 8). 
28. 17 Papers of James Madison at 190 (cited in note 8). 
29. See 17 Papers of James Madison at 185-88, 191 n.2 (cited in note 8). According 
to this source, the words had not been in Madison's original draft but were added by 
Wilson Cary Nicholas, at Jefferson's request, before John Taylor introduced the resolu-
tions into the Virginia General Assembly. This position, suggested by Koch and Ammon, 
5 Wm. & Mary Q. at 159-60 (cited in note 6), is based largely on a letter from Jefferson to 
Nicholas, dated November 29, 1798, which is reprinted in 7 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 
at 312-13 (cited in note 8). Jefferson urged that "instead of the invitation to cooperate in 
the annulment of the acts," it would be better to make the resolutions "an invitation 'to 
concur with this commonwealth in declaring, as it does hereby declare, that the said acts 
are, and were ab initio, null, void and of no force, or effect.' " But Gaillard Hunt, 6 
Writings of James Madison at 326-27 n.1 (cited in note 8), claimed that the draft, "as 
Madison prepared it," declared the acts "unconstitutional, null, void and of no effect." 
According to Hunt, "the words in italics [were) struck out as unnecessary repetition." Id. 
The available evidence is inconclusive. 
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unimpaired the authorities, rights, and liberties, reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people." The legislature called for 
"universal alarm" and urged that it would be "reproachful incon-
sistency and criminal degeneracy, if an indifference were now 
shown to the most palpable violation[s]" of rights so anxiously 
secured by constitutional amendment.3o The resolutions were si-
lent, however, on what measures state officials had authority to 
take in protecting those rights. The document again asserted the 
state's interpretive independence and implied that those officials 
had no obligation to enforce the Alien and Sedition Acts, but did 
not address whether any person had authority to interfere with 
federal enforcement. 
Third, the legislature appealed to other states to join Vir-
ginia in declaring the Alien and Sedition Acts unconstitutional 
and in protecting reserved prerogatives of the states and the peo-
ple. The legislature pledged its "mutual friendship" in maintain-
ing "a scrupulous fidelity to [the] Constitution" and appealed to 
"the like dispositions of the other States."31 Among other things, 
these passages reflect Madison's commitment to joint as well as 
separate action. 
Finally, unlike Jefferson's resolutions, but like those adopted 
by the Kentucky legislature in 1798, copies of the Virginia Reso-
lutions were transmitted to "each of the Senators and Represent-
atives, representing this State in the Congress of the United 
States. "32 Like a majority of the Kentucky legislators in 1798, 
Madison sought formal change through established institutions 
of federal government. His aspirations, like those of the Ken-
tucky legislators, were realized in some form through the Repub-
lican party's rise to power and the demise of the Alien and 
Sedition Acts. 
In the shorter term, however, concurrence and reversal were 
not forthcoming. On the contrary, a majority of co-states criti-
cized the Kentucky and Virginia legislatures' claims of interpre-
tive independence. Madison was asked to defend the Virginia 
Resolutions against the other states' criticisms, which he did by 
drafting a "Report on the Virginia Resolutions." Before study-
30. 17 Papers of James Madison at 189-90. Madison was referring, of course, to the 
First Amendment. His draft emphasized that the Alien and Sedition Acts were "levelled 
against that right of freely examining public characters and measures, and of free commu-
nication among the people thereon, which has ever been justly deemed, the only effectual 
guardian of every other right." I d. 
31. Id. at 190. 
32. Id. 
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ing that report, it is helpful to review the charges to which 
Madison was responding and some of the dilemmas he faced. 
II. REJOINDERS 
A 
Ten of the existing sixteen states' legislatures formally or in-
formally rejected the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 
1798.33 Seven states responded directly by returning formal reso-
lutions. Five of these states' legislatures asserted that federal 
courts held the prerogative that Jefferson had claimed the states 
held: authority to invalidate federal legislation as unconstitu-
tional.34 The legislatures' positions on this issue were remarkably 
confident, considering that the controversy over the Alien and 
Sedition Acts preceded Marbury v. Madison.3s Two other states' 
legislatures affirmed principles of federal supremacy more gener-
ally by asserting that the Virginia Resolutions unjustifiably inter-
fered with the "constituted authorities" of the United States.36 
Three states rejected the resolutions without returning formal 
protests,37 and four states were silent.3s 
33. The formal responses are reprinted in 4 Debates at 532-39 (cited in note 8). 
Other responses are described and reprinted in Frank M. Anderson, Contemporary Opin-
ion of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, 5 Am. Hist. Rev. 45 (1890); 5 id. at 225. 
34. The General Assembly of Rhode Island claimed that the United States Supreme 
Court had ultimate authority to decide on "the constitutionality of any act or law of the 
Congress of the United States." The Massachusetts legislature was less direct but clearly 
implied that the Supreme Court had ultimate authority to decide on the constitutionality 
of federal legislation. The New York legislature indicated that states were bound by deci-
sions of federal courts and denied that state legislatures had authority "to supervise the 
acts of the general government." The New Hampshire legislature claimed that the duty to 
decide on the constitutionality of "laws of the general government ... is properly and 
exclusively confided to the judicial department" of that government. Finally, the Ver-
mont legislature asserted that power "to decide on the constitutionality of laws made by 
the general government [was] exclusively vested in the judiciary courts of the Union." 4 
Debates at 533-39. 
35. Marbury was decided in 1803. But see Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (Dall.) 386 (1798), 
in which the Supreme Court assumed authority to review the constitutionality of state 
legislation. Compare generally James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American 
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1893); Edward S. Corwin, The Es-
tablishment of Judicial Review, 9 Mich. L. Rev. 102, 102-25, 283-316 (1910). 
36. The General Assembly of Delaware tersely characterized the resolutions of 1798 
as "a very unjustifiable interference with the general government and constituted authori-
ties of the United States, and of dangerous tendency." The General Assembly of Con-
necticut expressed its approval of the constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition Acts and 
declared that they had been enacted by "the constituted authorities." 4 Debates at 532, 
538. 
37. The legislatures of Maryland, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania took actions that 
opposed the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions but did not return formal responses. See 
Anderson, 5 Am. Hist. Rev. at 46-52 and app. (cited in note 33). 
38. The four silent states were from the South: North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Georgia, and Tennessee. See id. at 235-36 for a summary of the meager evidence of 
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It is not surprising that a majority of the states sided with the 
federal government. Representative structures made that result 
likely. Although Congress had means of rising above or sinking 
below majority sentiment, the national legislature was also 
designed to be responsive to its constituents. Furthermore, exec-
utive and judicial officials were not isolated from pressures or 
sentiments that presumably had led to passage of the Alien and 
Sedition Acts. Each state had interests in backing the federal 
government's enforcement of laws benefitting them, and federal 
structures provided no formal means for dissenting states to go 
against collective determinations. Instead, the concept of na-
tional supremacy weighed against particular states impeding the 
enactment and enforcement of laws that were backed by at least 
a majority of the states' legislatures (and presumably the people 
at large). 
Hence the feature that made the concept of national 
supremacy most attractive, the principle of subordinating sepa-
rate to collective prerogatives, also posed the greatest threat to 
principles of limited government. There was a danger that those 
entrusted with instruments of collective power would use them to 
enforce compliance with decisions on matters that were reserved 
by the Constitution for separate determination. These principles 
applied to rights and powers reserved to the people separately, 
not just to powers of the states. In each case, it was problematic 
to rely on institutions that held collective power to define the 
scope of their authority and limitations on its exercise. 
It made sense, therefore, for the dissenting states not to 
make their opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts contingent 
on other states' concurrence. Accordingly, the Virginia and Ken-
tucky legislatures asserted that the acts were unconstitutional 
even if a majority of the states supported them. If the laws were 
unconstitutional, and if a majority of the states did favor them, 
there would have been a failure of constitutionalism, and dissent-
ing states would have been in a perilous predicament. 
The two dissenting states' legislatures argued, in essence, 
that there had been a form of constitutional breakdown but tem-
pered opposition to federal representational processes with rec-
ognition of the need to give such structures a chance to correct 
themselves. The Kentucky and Virginia legislatures primarily 
emphasized an established means of constitutional correction: re-
proceedings in such states with respect to the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions. Ander-
son reasonably speculated that some Southern legislators may have been uncertain what 
remedies were appropriate even if such persons were sympathetic with the Kentucky and 
Virginia legislatures' opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts. 
330 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 11:315 
peal by Congress. But these two legislatures also asserted that 
interim or alternative measures were necessary to protect the 
people's rights within the states' borders.39 The Resolutions ap-
parently sanctioned disregard of the Alien and Sedition Acts by 
state citizens and public officials. Perhaps the legislators also 
sought to reinforce opposition, in practice, to enforcement of the 
laws by federal officials. 
The Republican party's electoral victories in 1800 did not 
negate the importance of the Kentucky and Virginia legislatures' 
efforts to oppose the objectionable acts' enforcement even prior 
to their expiration. These forms of resistance were comparable 
to individuals' disobeying laws prior to their repeal or judicial 
declarations of unconstitutionality. In many cases, disregard of 
laws has been a predicate to judicial review, stimulated political 
discourse, or otherwise influenced legislative reconsideration.40 
Similar forms of resistance by institutions of state government 
have also been warranted under appropriate circumstances. In 
each case, later reversals have affirmed rather than mooted chal-
lenges on constitutional grounds.41 
B 
Jefferson's draft was solidly grounded to the extent it as-
serted the states' interpretive independence. But the draft was 
39. The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, like Jefferson's draft, placed less emphasis 
on the possibility of correction by the federal judiciary, but neither set of resolutions ruled 
out that possibility. As indicated in the text, judicial review is best viewed as an alterna-
tive means of constitutional correction. It has important advantages over ordinary legisla-
tive processes: its interim character (it does not depend on elections), and the fact that it 
operates through ordinary constitutional forms (adjudication) rather than extraordinary 
forms (such as constitutional amendment). The principal disadvantage of judicial review, 
of course, is that it permits legislators to escape responsibility for repealing unconstitu-
tional acts. 
40. Compare Robert M. Cover's argument, in The Supreme Coun, 1982 Term: Fore-
word: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev 4, 46-47 (1983), that those who disregard 
laws as unconstitutional do not necessarily regard their actions as forms of "civil disobedi-
ence" but as means of being faithful to higher law standards of the Constitution itself. To 
treat such actions as forms of "civil disobedience" privileges official interpretations that 
may be erroneous. 
41. Claims of constitutional prerogative to resist enforcement of laws do not neces-
sarily depend, however, on any particular governmental officials' subsequently endorsing 
such positions. An analogous example is the late Frederick Douglass' efforts to interpret 
the Constitution during the antebellum period as inconsistent with slavery. (Douglass 
initially endorsed William Garrison's position that the Constitution was pro-slavery.) 
One may affirm Douglass' radical anti-slavery interpretive positions and regard them as 
constitutionally authoritative, even though they never received official endorsement by 
the Supreme Court or other federal institutions. It took a Civil War and formal amend-
ments, not just reinterpretations of existing norms, before anti-slavery constitutionalism 
received official prominence. 
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on more tenuous ground insofar as it went further and claimed to 
have greater formal significance than the resolutions actually ap-
proved by the Kentucky and Virginia legislatures in 1798. Jeffer-
son's version of the Kentucky Resolutions claimed to do within 
the state what several of the states assumed judicial review could 
do within the nation: formally invalidate, or annul, acts of legisla-
tion on constitutional grounds prior to legislative repeal or 
expiration. 
Both methods would have utilized established constitutional 
forms: state legislatures or federal courts. Both would have been 
means of vindicating individual rights and other constitutional 
prerogatives that were vulnerable to majoritarian infringement. 
There was textual support for each position: the Tenth Amend-
ment and Articles III and VI of the original text.42 But these two 
means of nullification presupposed radically different concep-
tions of the proper methods for correcting constitutional mis-
takes at the federal level. 
The Kentucky legislature eventually embraced Jefferson's 
claim that the states had authority to nullify the Alien and Sedi-
tion Acts. After a majority of the states rejected Kentucky's and 
Virginia's overtures, the Kentucky legislature adopted a second 
set of resolutions in 1799 that included provisions on nullification 
comparable to those in Jefferson's original draft but deleted from 
the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798. In 1799, the Kentucky legisla-
ture resolved: 
That the several states who formed [the Constitution], being 
sovereign and independent, have the unquestionable right to 
judge of the infraction; and, That a nullification, by those sov-
ereignties, of all unauthorized acts done under color of that in-
strument, is the rightful remedy.43 
These resolutions reflect a significantly stronger conception of 
state authority than the Resolutions of 1798. 
As with Jefferson's draft, it is not clear whether the Ken-
tucky legislators were claiming in 1799 that they had authority to 
nullify the Alien and Sedition Acts unilaterally or whether the 
legislators presupposed only that the states collectively had such 
authority. The Kentucky legislature expressed its unwillingness 
to "surrender its opinion to a majority of its sister states" on this 
"momentous" issue. In any event, the legislators apparently con-
42. The constitutional text does not, however, explicitly delegate the power of judi-
cial review. 
43. See 4 Debates at 545 (cited in note 8) (emphasis in original). Compare Jeffer-
son's draft, reprinted in 7 Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 301 (cited in note 8). 
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eluded that they had exhausted all other appropriate interim 
remedies and no longer looked to statutory repeal or constitu-
tional amendment as likely means of redress. They vowed to 
"oppose, in a constitutional manner, every attempt, at what quar-
ter soever offered, to violate [the federal] compact."44 
The state legislature's assertion of authority to disregard 
decisions by federal officials was in tension with principles of 
constitutional representation. The Constitution's authority pur-
ported to flow from the people of the United States as a collec-
tivity and/or from the states acting collectively, not from the 
states separately or their legislatures. The Constitution, in tum, 
has entrusted a range of governing authority to institutions that 
have purportedly represented the whole people and all the states. 
Principles of legal supremacy have required the subordination of 
separately held prerogatives to laws made by such institutions. It 
would have been anomalous if state officials, acting on behalf of 
a state, could legitimately preempt decisions made by federal of-
ficials on behalf of the entire United States. Similar principles 
have applied to relationships between assertions of individual 
rights or powers and exercises of federal or state governmental 
powers.4s 
The Constitution has not, however, given federal officials 
authority to preempt all separate determinations. On the con-
trary, it has delegated limited federal powers and reserved some 
rights and powers to be exercised separately by individuals, 
groups, and the states as such. Along with arguing that the Alien 
and Sedition Acts were invalid as ultra vires, the Virginia and 
Kentucky legislatures exercised forms of speech, petitioning, and 
other means of influencing federal actions. These two legisla-
tures presumed that the Constitution reserved these prerogatives 
to the respective states rather than precluded their separate 
exercise. 
The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions did more than assert 
the states' powers of political expression. The two legislatures 
also claimed to be protecting similar prerogatives of the people 
from abridgement by federal officials. According to the Resolu-
tions, the Alien and Sedition Acts imposed impermissible re-
straints on citizens' rights of free speech, the press, and the like. 
Other rights and powers were beneath the surface but no less 
44. 4 Debates at 545. 
45. In McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), Chief Justice John 
Marshall developed arguments for national supremacy within the federal government's 
sphere of delegated authority. The Court reaffirmed these principles in United States v. 
Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
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significant: voting prerogatives of the people and state legisla-
tures, along with their respective powers to initiate constitutional 
change through formal amendments. 
It is noteworthy that the Constitution did not expressly re-
serve to the states or their legislatures the authority to act on 
behalf of the states' residents by the forms of speech, petitioning, 
and influence that the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions exem-
plify. This omission did not imply, however, that the states had 
no such authority. On the contrary, the Tenth Amendment's ref-
erence to the states' reserved powers, like the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments' references to unenumerated rights and powers of 
the people, reinforced the legislatures' positions. 
Because the Tenth Amendment is open ended, it no more 
settled questions concerning the states' powers of protest than it 
settled arguments over the constitutionality of the acts them-
selves. These two issues were, of course, distinct: the validity of 
the Alien and Sedition Acts and the validity of the Kentucky and 
Virginia legislatures' responses to the federal enactments. Fur-
thermore, as indicated, issues of interpretive authority were 
equally relevant at both levels. The controversy over the Alien 
and Sedition Acts not only raised questions about who had au-
thority to decide on the acts' validity; it also raised questions 
about who had authority to decide on the scope of the states' 
powers of protest. 
c 
In a lengthy "Report on the Virginia Resolutions," which 
the Virginia General Assembly approved early in 1800, Madison 
defended the Virginia Resolutions of 1798 against the other 
states' criticisms.46 Among other things, the Report revisited the 
issue of a collective nullifying authority. It also analyzed more 
thoroughly the constitutional significance of state legislatures' 
separate determinations. 
In the course of defending the state legislature's approval of 
the Virginia Resolutions, Madison relied on distinctions among 
the states, their legislatures, and the people thereof. He ob-
served that the term "states" had several meanings: 
It is indeed true that the term "States," is sometimes used in a 
vague sense, and sometimes in different senses, according to 
46. Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolutions (January 7, 1800) is reprinted in 17 
Papers of James Madison at 307-51 (cited in note 8). The Virginia legislature adopted the 
Report substantially as drafted by Madison, and thus it is not necessary to distinguish his 
draft from the final version. 
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the subject to which it is applied. Thus it sometimes means the 
separate sections of territory occupied by the political societies 
within each; sometimes the particular governments, estab-
lished by those societies; sometimes those societies as organ-
ized into those particular governments; and lastly, it means the 
people composing those political societies, in their highest sov-
ereign capacity.47 
He claimed that "all will at least concur" that the "States," in the 
last sense, were parties to the Constitution because it was submit-
ted to the people of the states and they ratified it in their highest 
sovereign capacity.4s 
Madison extended this line of reasoning, with its emphasis 
on the states' foundational political powers, by arguing explicitly 
what he had only suggested before. He argued that the states, as 
sovereign entities, had authority to overrule usurpations of 
power by federal officials. Echoing Jefferson's position in his 
draft of the Kentucky Resolutions, Madison asserted that the 
Constitution, like other compacts, was governed by the "plain 
principle, founded in common sense, illustrated by common prac-
tice, and essential to the nature of compacts; that where resort 
can be had to no tribunal superior to the authority of the parties, 
the parties themselves must be the rightful judges in the last re-
sort, whether the bargain made, has been pursued or violated." 
Because "the states [were] parties to the constitutional compact, 
and in their sovereign capacity," Madison reasoned, "there can 
be no tribunal above their authority, to decide in the last resort, 
whether the compact made by them be violated." Thus he con-
cluded that the states "must themselves decide in the last resort, 
such questions as may be of sufficient magnitude to require their 
interposition. "49 
Accordingly, Madison denied that the United States 
Supreme Court was, as several of the state legislatures had 
claimed, "the sole expositor of the constitution, in the last re-
sort." Again echoing Jefferson's position, Madison explained 
that "this resort must necessarily be deemed the last in relation 
to the authorities of the other departments of the government; 
not in relation to the rights of the parties to the constitutional 
compact, from which the judicial as well as the other departments 
hold their delegated trusts." Even the judiciary might "exercise 
or sanction dangerous powers beyond the grant of the constitu-
47. ld. at 308-09. 
48. Id. at 309. 
49. ld. at 309-10. 
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tion." For this reason, "the ultimate right of the parties to the 
constitution, to judge whether the compact has been dangerously 
violated, must extend to violations by one delegated authority, as 
well as by another; by the judiciary, as well as by the executive, 
or the legislature. "so 
Later in the Report, however, Madison equivocated on the 
status of the Virginia legislature's declaration of unconstitution-
ality. In these later passages, he emphasized the states' powers to 
act as intermediaries and their power of communication rather 
than their power to judge authoritatively the validity of federal 
actions. On the other hand, several passages indicate that he was 
taking a position that the states collectively had some sort of nul-
lifying power, even if they did not have that authority separately. 
In analyzing the states' powers of "interposition," Madison 
referred to expectations during the founding period that state 
legislatures would act as intermediaries between the people and 
the federal government. He alluded to criticisms of the proposed 
Constitution and pointed out that in response to such criticisms, 
"the appeal was emphatically made to the intermediate existence 
of the state governments between the people and [the general] 
government." More specifically, he observed that state govern-
ments had been expected to "descry the first symptoms of usur-
pation" and to "sound the alarm to the public." It is not clear 
whether Madison was endorsing the potential role of state legis-
latures as protectors of the people's rights simply (though pro-
foundly) because there had been an historical understanding on 
this issue or because he thought it was a good argument, in-
dependent of historical expectations. In any event, he linked the 
states' action to historical expectations.st 
Other historical sources provided further support for 
Madison's position. According to the Annals of Congress, when 
he had introduced a proposed bill of rights, Madison had empha-
sized how the proposed amendments would reinforce the ability 
of state legislatures to oppose unconstitutional actions by federal 
officials. His underlying assumption had been that the states' re-
50. ld. at 311. Madison also explained that interposition by the states was warranted 
in those "great and extraordinary cases, in which all the forms of the Constitution may 
prove ineffectual against infractions dangerous to the essential rights of the parties to it." 
Id. Compare his anticipation in The Federalist No. 51, of the need for checks on the 
federal government by the states. 
51. 17 Papers of James Madison at 349-50 (cited in note 8). Compare The Federalist 
Nos. 26, 28 & 44. Alexander Hamilton in the 78th Federalist and John Marshall in deci-
sions such as Marbury v. Madison relied on similar conceptions of representation to de-
fend judicial review. Each grounded the authority of governmental officials on that of 
"the people." 
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served powers and the people's retained rights overlapped. 
Based on that insight, he had claimed that state legislatures 
would be vigilant in protesting usurpations of power and would 
thereby serve as "sure guardians of the people's liberty." He had 
gone so far as to urge that the states acting in that capacity would 
"be able to resist with more effect every assumption of power, 
than any other power on earth [could] do."s2 
Madison's "Report on the Virginia Resolutions" thus com-
plemented those Resolutions and earlier arguments that state 
legislatures could legitimately act on behalf of the states' citizens 
by opposing unconstitutional federal legislation at least some 
ways and for some purposes. At a high level of generality, this 
assertion was obviously correct. The important question, how-
ever, was more specifically whether the Virginia Resolutions 
qualified as a legitimate exercise of such power. That question, 
in turn, depended on what the Resolutions purported to do. 
In some places, Madison attributed limited significance to 
the Resolutions. His Report indicated that declarations of un-
constitutionality by one or more states, whether expressed by 
their legislatures or otherwise, were merely "expressions of opin-
ion, unaccompanied with any other effect than what they may 
produce on opinion, by exciting reflection." Such declarations 
"may lead to a change in the legislative expression of the general 
will; possibly to a change in the opinion of the judiciary." 
Madison repeatedly denied that such a declaration would either 
nullify the Alien and Sedition Acts or adjudicate their validity. 
He emphasized his point by way of contrast in assuming that "ex-
positions of the judiciary, on the other hand, are carried into im-
mediate effect by force."s3 
He compared communications among state governments to 
communications among the people themselves: 
[A) free communication among the states, where the constitu-
tion imposes no restraint, is as allowable among the state gov-
ernments, as among other public bodies, or private citizens. 
This consideration derives a weight, that cannot be denied to 
it, from the relation of the state legislatures, to the federal leg-
islature, as the immediate constituents of one of its branches. 54 
Madison emphasized how state legislatures were distinctively 
positioned to act in dual capacities as representatives and as con-
stituents. He argued that state legislatures were responsible for 
52. 1 Annals of Congress at 439 (June 8, 1789) (cited in note 19). 
53. 17 Papers of James Madison at 348 (cited in note 8). 
54. Id. 
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fostering communication among their constituents and also 
needed to communicate among themselves both to ensure their 
proper representation in the Senate and as predicates to other 
collective actions.ss 
Madison did not, therefore, view state legislative interposi-
tion merely as an exercise of the state's will. He also suggested 
that such an action could appeal to others' judgment as it might 
relate to further formal action. He had explained in the 44th 
Federalist that state legislatures could seek congressional repeal 
of unconstitutional legislation by replacing their Senators and ex-
erting their "local influence" over elections to the House of Rep-
resentatives.s6 He later extended this reasoning and suggested 
that state officials might have petitioned Congress to propose an 
explanatory amendment or applied for a constitutional conven-
tion to overrule the Alien and Sedition Acts.s1 These remarks 
indicate that he thought the success of the Virginia Resolutions 
would depend largely on their effects on constitutional choices by 
members of Congress, the federal judiciary, and state legislators. 
Madison was unclear, however, on whether he was assuming 
that the Resolutions were significant only as predicates to other 
actions or also because they had some sort of intrinsic normative 
effect. He commented: 
[I]f the other states had concurred in making a like declara-
tion, supported too by the numerous applications flowing im-
mediately from the people, it can scarcely be doubted, that 
these simple means would have been as sufficient, as they are 
unexceptionable.ss 
He did not give his views on what the consequences of such con-
currence would have been. 
There are at least three ways of reading this passage. First, 
he might have been claiming that applications (or "petitions") 
from among "the people" at large would have annulled the Alien 
and Sedition Acts even if the state legislatures' declarations of 
55. Madison suggested that communication among states was necessary in connec-
tion with their (a) conveying views to their representatives in the Senate, {b) originating 
constitutional amendments, (c) deciding whether to admit new states, and (d) entering 
into contracts with one another. See id. The Seventeenth Amendment's adoption in 1913 
did not preclude state officials from representing the people in the ways that Madison 
defended. If anything, this change in constitutional structures increased the importance 
of institutions acting as intermediaries between the people and the federal government. 
56. See The Federalist No. 44. 
57. 17 Papers of James Madison at 349 (cited in note 8). Compare his piece, Notes 
On Nullification (1835·36), reprinted in 9 Writings of James Madison at 573-607 (cited in 
note 8). 
58. 17 Papers of James Madison at 349 (cited in note 8). 
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unconstitutionality had not had that effect. Second, he might 
have thought the concurrence of other state legislatures would 
have effectively nullified the laws, at least if there was evidence 
that a preponderance of the people supported the states against 
the federal government. Third, he might have thought that pub-
lic opinion would eventually prevail in dictating the choices made 
by federal representatives even if petitions or resolutions from 
state legislatures and/or the people at large had not themselves 
had any intrinsic normative consequences. According to this last 
reading, the appropriate measure of the resolutions' success 
would be their effect on public opinion rather than whether they 
had annulled the federal laws.s9 
The first reading, that the people's separate petitions might 
nullify the Acts, would have been inconsistent with other posi-
tions that Madison had articulated. He would not have consid-
ered separate actions by the people at large to be any more 
effective than separate resolutions by state legislatures. As he 
had explained to the First Congress, separate bodies of the peo-
ple could not overturn actions by representatives of the whole 
people.60 
The second reading, that collective state action might nullify 
the Acts, would have best complemented the text of the Virginia 
Resolutions, Madison's comments to Jefferson, and earlier 
passages in the "Report on the Virginia Resolutions." These 
materials presupposed that concurrent actions by at least a ma-
jority of the states, acting together on behalf of the people of the 
respective states and/or the people of the United States in their 
combined sovereign capacity, would have had normative conse-
quences transcending actions by the states separately and even 
might have superseded actions by the federal government. 
59. Compare Marshall's emphasis in McCulloch on federal structures as vehicles for 
protecting state prerogatives and bringing about constitutional change. See also Justice 
Blackmun's opinion for the Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author· 
ity, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
60. In debates over whether the First Congress should add to the First Amend-
ment's precursor a provision guaranteeing a right of the people to instruct their repre~nt­
atives, Madison argued that sovereignty in America was held by the whole Amencan 
people rather than "detached bodies" of them. He reportedly observed that "the in-
habitants of any district" do not "speak the voice of the people; so far from it, their ideas 
may contradict the sense of the whole people." He indicated that "the people [could] 
change the constitution if they please[d]," but he claimed that "while the constitution 
exists, they must conform themselves to its dictates." His position, in other words, was 
that part of "the people" could not legitimately "contravene an act established by the 
whole people." He concluded, therefore, that it was "not true" that "the people have a 
right to instruct their representatives in such a sense as that the delegates are obli~ed ~o 
conform to those instructions." 1 Annals of Congress at 738-39 (Aug. 15, 1789) (ctted m 
note 19). 
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Madison did not, however, fully explore that possibility in his Re-
port because the issue had become moot by then. Between 1798 
and 1800, a majority of the states had declined to concur in the 
Kentucky and Virginia declarations of unconstitutionality.6t 
Nevertheless, it is significant that Madison apparently would 
have attributed greater authority to joint actions by united states 
than to actions by the federal government, at least under some 
circumstances, even if the states had acted outside forms estab-
lished by the Constitution. Such a concurrent action, claiming to 
be grounded in the sovereign authority of the American people 
(whether of the states combined or of the United States as such), 
would have represented an exercise of power comparable to judi-
cial review but surpassing it in scale. Like judicial review, this 
determination would not have purported to change constitu-
tional standards. Instead, it allegedly would have reaffirmed ex-
isting constitutional norms. The vehicle for making that 
affirmation, however, would have been state legislatures rather 
than federal courts. Given the states' roles in adopting and 
amending the Constitution and their direct and indirect represen-
tation in the federal government, the constitutional and political 
dimensions of such a determination could not have been easily 
dismissed. 
It was unlikely such a combined action would take place un-
less there was a wide gulf between governmental actions and pre-
dominant dispositions among the people at large. At the time of 
the Constitution's framing, however, many persons appear to 
have been concerned about precisely that type of possibility. 
Furthermore, it is conceivable that much of the public at large 
might have supported combined efforts of several states against 
the federal government during the Republic's early years if the 
latter government had egregiously violated foundational princi-
ples of American constitutionalism (as the dissenting states un-
derstood them). Jefferson and Madison treated the Alien and 
61. Compare Madison's later comment on the Virginia Resolutions in his piece, 
Notes On Nullification, reprinted in 9 Writings of James Madison at 592 (cited in note 8): 
It is sometimes asked in what mode the States could interpose in their col-
lective character as parties to the Constitution against usurped power. It was 
not necessary for the object & reasoning of the resolutions & report, that the 
mode should be pointed out. It was sufficient to show that the authority to inter-
pose existed, and was a resort beyond that of the Supreme Court of the U.S. or 
any authority derived from the Constitution. The authority being plenary, the 
mode was of its own choice, and it is obvious, that, if employed by the States as 
co-parties to and creators of the Constitution it might either so explain the Con-
stitution or so amend it as to provide a more satisfactory mode within the Con-
stitution itself for guarding it against constructive or other violations. 
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Sedition Acts as if they might precipitate a constitutional crisis of 
this seriousness and magnitude. 
The third reading of Madison's remarks, looking to the Res-
olutions' effects on public opinion, would have complemented 
the idea of a collective nullifying authority and would have been 
more practically relevant under the circumstances. Madison rec-
ognized that elected officials were ordinarily responsive to con-
stituent demands. Furthermore, public sentiment within much of 
the nation presumably supported rather than opposed the Alien 
and Sedition Acts.6z Madison's awareness of the power of public 
opinion in a republic such as the United States alerted him to the 
dangerous tendencies of national sentiment. When commenting 
on the likely efficacy of a bill of rights, Madison had suggested to 
Jefferson that majority tyranny was more of a threat to individual 
rights than was the possibility that representatives might go 
against their constituents' wishes.63 
In addition to setting a dangerous precedent for the im-
proper working of governmental institutions, the Alien and Sedi-
tion Acts tested popular commitment to principles of 
representative government. The crisis might have been a turning 
point on whether the public at large would sanction or oppose 
exercises of federal power beyond constitutional boundaries. 
The people's acquiescence in such a transgression would have 
provided a foundation for future encroachments on rights.64 
That prospect would have deeply troubled Madison. 
Much of what we know of Madison's thinking relates to his 
hope that constitutional structures would elevate government 
above transient sentiments and allow representatives to make 
and enforce laws in accordance with the first principles set forth 
in the Constitution itself. Congress' passage of the Alien and Se-
dition Acts and the federal judiciary's enforcement of the laws 
went against these aspirations. Rather than rising above public 
sentiments, the federal government had led the people away 
from foundational principles. This crisis thus highlighted the 
62. See Anderson, 5 Am. Hist. Rev. (cited in note 33). 
63. See Madison's Letter to Jefferson, Oct. 17, 1788, reprinted in 11 Papers of James 
Madison at 295, 298 (cited in note 8) ("In our Governments the real power lies in the 
majority of the Community, and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be appre-
hended, not from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from 
acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of the major number of the constit-
uents.") (emphasis in original). 
64. Compare Jefferson's Letter to Stephens Thompson Mason, Oct. 11, 1798, re-
printed in 7 Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 282-83 (cited in note 8) (Jefferson warned 
that public acquiescence in the Alien and Sedition Acts would set a dangerous 
precedent). 
191)4] VIRGINIA AND KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS 341 
need for additional precautions against abuses of power. The 
Bill of Rights had been one such "ancillary precaution," but that 
"legal check" had failed even in the hands of the federal judici-
ary.6s Thus Madison turned to another major check on federal 
power: state governments. 
In addition to having regulatory powers of their own, these 
governments were uniquely situated to influence public opinion. 
State officials could also serve one of the same crucial functions 
that federal structures had been designed to achieve: to recall 
public opinion to fundamental principles and to encourage the 
people and their representatives to rise above passing factional-
ism. Madison was probably aware that his efforts to enlist state 
legislatures as vehicles for shaping public opinion went against 
the people's momentary inclinations and those of their federal 
representatives. But he expressed a conviction that the viability 
of constitutional government would depend on the success of ef-
forts by him and others of like mind. 
III. PROBLEMS OF CONTINUING VIABILITY 
Constitutional developments since the late eighteenth cen-
tury have brought to the surface at least three sets of issues in-
volving claims of state interpretive autonomy. First, is the idea of 
dispersed interpretive authority consistent with commitment to 
the rule of law? Second, is that idea consistent with the Constitu-
tion's premise that its authority flows from "the people of the 
United States"? Third, have constitutional changes made obso-
lete the idea of state officials exercising powers inconsistent with 
federal positions?66 
65. Compare Thomas Jefferson's Letter to James Madison, March 15, 1789, in which 
Jefferson suggested that a bill of rights would give judges a "legal check" to enforce 
against the people's elected representatives. The Jetter is reprinted in Julian P. Boyd, ed., 
14 Papers of Thomas Jefferson at 659-62 (Princeton U. Press, 1958). Madison reportedly 
repeated that argument on June 8, 1789, when he presented proposed amendments to the 
House of Representatives: He presumed that judges would "consider themselves in a pe-
culiar manner the guardians of those rights" and would be "naturally led to resist every 
encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the declaration 
of rights." See 1 Annals of Congress at 439 (cited in note 19). See also Wayne D. Moore, 
Written and Unwritten Constitutional Law in the Founding Period: The Early New Jersey 
Cases, 7 Const. Comm. 341 (1990). 
66. Like Jefferson's and Madison's reliance on institutions of state government to 
oppose exercises of federal power in 1798, other efforts to assert state autonomy have 
been tarnished by the association of such arguments with efforts by southern states to 
preserve slavery and oppose racial integration. Thus some persons may be inclined to 
regard the South's military defeat in the Civil War, along with the formal defeat of gov-
ernmentally sponsored racial inequality through the Reconstruction Amendments and 
their enforcement by federal officials, as constitutionally authoritative repudiations of 
claims that state officials have the sort of interpretive independence considered above. 
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A full examination of these issues is beyond the scope of this 
essay.67 But some treatment of them is necessary to evaluate the 
contemporary relevance of the Kentucky and Virginia Resolu-
tions and Madison's defense of the latter. Even if it is not possi-
ble to resolve finally problems that are wonderfully open-ended, 
there are good reasons for suggesting directions for further 
analysis. 
A 
There is no need for detailed analysis here of whether the 
rule of law is undercut by state officials' expressing, or communi-
cating, positions on constitutional issues. Nor is it within the 
scope of this essay to examine more closely whether the states, 
through legislatures or otherwise, may separately invalidate fed-
erallaws.6s But if one reaches a conclusion that representatives 
of a state may independently interpret the Constitution for some 
purposes but not others, there is a need to confront questions 
about how far principles of state interpretive autonomy extend. 
There are at least three ways to deal with controversies in-
volving efforts by state officials and/or the people of a state to act 
inconsistently with federal positions other than through the 
forms of speech and petitioning defended by Madison. First, one 
may assume that as a matter of constitutional logic, the Constitu-
tion necessarily means what one or more authoritative institu-
tions of the federal government declare it to mean. Jefferson, 
Madison, and the other authors of the Kentucky and Virginia 
Resolutions rejected such a skeptical conception of constitutional 
meaning. They presumed that the Constitution's meaning was 
See, e.g., Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate Constitu-
tional Interpreter, 48 Rev. Pol. 401, 420 n.28 (1986) (suggested that the Civil War "effec-
tively invalidated" claims of "confederated departmentalism," or "nullification," 
including the forms advocated by Jefferson in the Kentucky Resolutions and by Calhoun 
and others during the antebellum period). 
67. It is also beyond the scope of this essay to examine the practical implications of 
affirming state interpretive autonomy. My main concern is constitutional norms, which 
are distinguishable from actual political practices. But these two issues are not com-
pletely severable, because constitutional norms are created through political practices, 
and an important criterion for evaluating the Constitution's normative structures is how 
they have operated (or are operating) in practice. 
68. Interestingly, section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 apparently contemplated 
state judges deciding on the validity of federal treaties, statutes and other exercises of 
federal power. The Judiciary Act, like its contemporary equivalent, also presumed that 
Article III gave the Supreme Court authority to review these decisions, among others. 
Not surprisingly, states have opposed the Supreme Court's exercise of this appellate 
power. See generally Charles Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme 
Court of the United States-A History of the Twenty-Fifth Section of the Judiciary Act, 47 
Am. L. Rev. 1 (1913); 47 id. at 161. 
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independent not only of their positions but also of interpreta-
tions by one or more federal officials. Many persons today 
would likewise deny that the Constitution's meaning is properly 
reducible to interpretations of it by any particular institution or 
set of institutions, including the Supreme Court and/or other fed-
eral officials.69 
A second possibility is that the Constitution does not pre-
suppose skepticism regarding its own meaning, but does give 
legal finality for some purposes to certain types of governmental 
decisions, such as decisions by courts of last resort, even when 
those decisions do not measure up to standards of the Constitution 
itself Writing in the mid-1830's, Madison took such a position in 
the context of criticizing the South Carolina legislature's claim of 
a unilateral nullifying authority. In an apparent retreat from his 
position in the Virginia Resolutions and his defense of them, 
Madison argued that it would be incoherent for a state to claim a 
constitutional right to disobey "the constitutional authority": 
It remains, however, for the nullifying expositors to spec-
ify the right & mode of interposition which the Resolution 
meant to assign to the States individually . ... 
They cannot say that the right meant was a Constl. right 
to resist the Constitutional authy; for that is a contradiction in 
terms, as much as a legal right to resist a law.70 
Variations of this argument remain viable. The Supreme Court 
has treated its own decisions as parts of the "supreme law" that 
others are bound to obey;71 and commentators have defended 
that approach as an essential component of the rule of law.72 
69. Arguments for judicial review, as articulated by Alexander Hamilton in the 78th 
Federalist and as asserted by John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, have traditionally 
rested on an assumption that the Constitution's meaning transcends judicial interpreta-
tions. For more recent analyses of this issue from a variety of perspectives, see Sotirios A. 
Barber, On What the Constitution Means (Johns Hopkins U. Press, 1984); William F. Har-
ris, II, The Interpretable Constitution (Johns Hopkins U. Press, 1993); Edwin Meese, III, 
The Law of the Constitution, 61 Thl. L. Rev. 979 (1987). 
70. Madison, Notes On Nullification, included among The Papers of James Madison, 
vol. 89 (Library of Congress, Manuscript Collection) (emphasis in original). Hunt's ver-
sion incorrectly shows "construction," not "contradiction." 
71. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 
(1974). The former case dealt with relationships between the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tions and state officials' constitutional obligations; the latter dealt with whether the Presi-
dent was bound by the Supreme Court's opposing interpretation of the scope of the 
executive privilege. 
72. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The Binding Quality of Supreme Court Precedent, 61 
Thl. L. Rev. 991 (1987); Rex E. Lee, The Provinces of Constitutional Interpretation, 61 Tul. 
L. Rev. 1009 (1987); and Ramsey Clark, Enduring Constitutional Issues, 61 Thl. L. Rev. 
1093 (1987). For a more general defense of treating decisions by particular governmental 
344 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 11:315 
But Madison's reference to "the constitutional authority" 
raises serious questions about what institution, if any, has final 
interpretive authority for purposes of resolving contests among 
institutions of the federal government-whether or not the deci-
sions of that "constitutional authority" are final for other pur-
poses. Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, 
Frederick Douglass and others have joined Jefferson and the 
early Madison in denying that the Supreme Court's interpretive 
precedents preclude presidents and members of Congress from 
independently interpreting the scope of their delegated powers 
and limitations on their exercise.73 These persons treated con-
flicts among institutions of the federal government as integral 
components of a constitutional design that has depended on mu-
tually checking exercises of overlapping powers-including inter-
pretive powers. 
One might regard interpretive disputes, unlike other con-
flicting exercises of power, as inconsistent with constitutional ide-
als. Admittedly, interpretive disputes may represent a form of 
legal failure, since one or more officials may be acting based on 
distorted conceptions of constitutional meaning. Doubtless it 
would be better for federal officials to take fully consistent posi-
tions-with each other and with constitutional imperatives. 
Both dimensions of consistency are important. The Consti-
tution treats complementary positions as commendable only to 
the extent they are also consistent with requirements of law. In 
addition, the constitutional design reflects an assumption that its 
own norms are more likely to be vindicated through processes 
that allow for mutually checking exercises of power than through 
the consolidation of all powers in a single governmental institu-
tion. Allowing conflicting exercises of power, including interpre-
tive powers, is thus one means of checking positions that do not 
measure up to these ideals.74 
institutions as legally preclusive (at least for some purposes), see H.L.A. Hart, The Con-
cept of Law (Clarendon Press, 1%1). 
73. See notes 77-79, infra, and the accompanying text. See also Walter F. Murphy, 
48 Rev. Pol. (cited in note 66); Levinson, Constitutional Faith (cited in note 24); Stephen 
Macedo, Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism 
esp. ch. 4 (Oxford U. Press, 1990); Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues: Interpretation 
as Political Process (Princeton U. Press, 1988); Mark Thshnet, The Supreme Court, the 
Supreme Law of the Land and Attorney General Meese: A Comment, 61 Thl. L. Rev. 1017 
(1987); Robert F. Nagel, A Comment on Democratic Constitutionalism, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 
1027 (1987); and Sanford Levinson Could Meese be Right this Tzme?, 61 Thl. L. Rev. 1071 
(1987). 
74. See, e.g., James Madison's arguments in the lOth and 51st Federalist that mutu-
ally checking governmental powers would be most likely to result in the making and en-
forcement of laws to promote the common good without abridging individual rights. 
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Accordingly, interpretive disputes are signs of constitutional 
vitality, not just failure, at least when federal officials rely on the 
Constitution to limit the effects of others' distorted interpreta-
tions. Commitment to the rule of law, understood as compliance 
with the Constitution's own imperatives, undercuts rather than 
supports federal officials deferring to others' mistaken interpre-
tations of the Constitution itself. In practice, therefore, the rule 
of law is promoted by the Constitution's being flexible enough to 
allow different persons, at least at the federal level, to act based 
on diverging interpretive positions. In short, constitutional gov-
ernment may well presuppose rather than preempt interpretive 
disagreement among federal officials.7s 
The Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions support an analo-
gous conception of relationships between federal and state inter-
pretive powers. These documents, in various forms, reflect an 
assumption that the states have authority to interpret and exer-
cise their powers even in opposition to authoritative decisions by 
one or more federal officials. This position offers an alternative 
to those identified above: skepticism about the independence of 
constitutional meanings from particular interpretations, or as-
suming that federal decisions preempt opposing actions even 
when the decisions are inconsistent with constitutional norms. 
Notwithstanding Madison's later claim, it is not inconsistent 
to argue that states have a constitutional power to disregard un-
constitutional federal actions. But there is an important qualifi-
cation: constitutional logic supports a conclusion that state 
officials only have authority to exercise their powers, not others'. 
Interpretive conflict may not legitimately arise through state offi-
cials' purporting to exercise federal powers.76 There are good 
reasons for concluding, though, that states may interpret and ex-
ercise their powers independently-with reference to the Consti-
tution itself and not in subordination to applicable federal 
precedents-even if the result is a conflict, in practice, between 
state and federal actions. 
This approach treats interpretive and other powers as sym-
metrical. As John Marshall argued in Marbury v. Madison, fed-
75. There are doubtless limits, in practice, to the Constitution's ability to accommo-
date interpretive disagreement-limits that were crossed around the time of the Civil 
War. It is beyond the scope of this essay to examine these limits. The important point for 
present purposes is that the Constitution can accommodate some interpretive 
disagreement. 
76. As suggested above, however, there may be special circumstances under which 
state judges or other officials may have authority to invalidate federal actions that are 
alleged to be unconstitutional (based on the standards of the federal Constitution) 
through the exercise of state powers, at least pending federal review of those actions. 
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eral judges may interpret the Constitution independently for 
purposes of deciding cases over which they have jurisdiction.77 
Likewise, presidents have the power claimed by Andrew Jack-
son: authority to decide for themselves on the validity of acts of 
Congress, at least for purposes of deciding whether to veto them, 
even if the result is an exercise of presidential power that con-
flicts with legislative and judicial interpretive precedents.7s Simi-
lar principles support Abraham Lincoln's argument that 
Congress and the people at large have interpretive powers corre-
sponding to their respective constitutional prerogatives: the Con-
stitution gives Congress authority to interpret its legislative 
powers, and the people at large may interpret the Constitution 
independently of governmental officials in deciding how to exer-
cise their rights and powers to political expression, voting, and 
the like.79 Although the Constitution obligates the states and 
their representatives to respect the authority of other persons to 
exercise their powers, the states (typically through representa-
tives) also may decide for themselves how to exercise their own. 
Such an approach would not automatically settle all disputes 
over constitutional issues or preclude interpretive mistakes. On 
the contrary, a position that the states (and their representatives) 
may legitimately exercise their reserved powers in opposition to 
unconstitutional federal actions, if accepted and acted upon by 
those who regard federal laws as invalid, might exacerbate inter-
77. Marshall's primary objective in Marbury was to deny claims of legislative inter-
pretive supremacy, a position inconsistent with judges reviewing the validity of legislative 
acts. It is less clear that Marshall sought to assert judicial interpretive supremacy. Ironi-
cally, his premise that other officials might, in practice, act inconsistently with constitu-
tional norms also applies to judges. Thus his claim that judges had authority to interpret 
the Constitution (particularly its delegation of judicial powers) independently of Congress 
supports, by analogy, arguments by other officials that they have a constitutional obliga-
tion to order their actions with reference to the Constitution even if doing so entails 
disregarding judicial positions. 
78. See Andrew Jackson, Veto of the Bank Bill, July 10, 1832, reprinted in James D. 
Richardson, ed., 2 A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 581-82 
(Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1908). 
79. In his speech at Springfield, Illinois, on July 17, 1858, Lincoln argued: "[Stephen 
Douglas] would have the citizen conform his vote to [the Supreme Court's decision in 
Dred Scott]; the Member of Congress, his; the President, his use of the veto power. He 
would make it a rule of political action for the people and all the departments of govern-
ment. I would not. By resisting it as a political rule, I disturb no right of property, create 
no disorder, excite no mobs." The speech is reprinted in Roy P. Basler, ed., 2 The Col-
lected Works of Abraham Lincoln 504-20 (Rutgers U. Press, 1953); the quote appears at 
516. Frederick Douglass had likewise argued in a speech on July 5, 1852, that "every 
American citizen has a right to form an opinion on the constitution, and to propagate that 
opinion, and to use all honorable means to make his opinion the prevailing one." 
Douglass' speech is reprinted by John W. Blassingame, ed., 2 The Frederick Douglass 
Papers 359-88 (Yale U. Press, 1982); the quote appears at 385. 
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pretive disputes. Some persons might use force, not just reason-
ing, to back up their positions.so 
These considerations do not indicate that a diffused or multi-
faceted conception of interpretive authority is flawed. Paying at-
tention to the states' interpretive prerogatives (along with 
others') and affirming commitment to them in practice would 
promote a healthy awareness of the possibilities and conse-
quences of interpretive mistakes. Much constitutional meaning is 
open ended, and arrangements among federal and state powers 
(along with relationships among governmental powers and rights 
and powers of the people at large) are extremely complex. As a 
result, a large measure of tentativeness in the exercise of political 
power is appropriate, particularly for those acting in opposition 
to others' normative claims. 
At the same time, principles of constitutional fidelity call for 
conviction to the imperatives of supreme law.st Sometimes those 
imperatives require persons to oppose others' actions. Being 
willing to vindicate constitutional norms by acting consistently 
80. One of the goals of the Federalists was to create a central government with 
enough coercive power to be able to overcome opposition from among the states, not just 
to be able to enforce laws against individuals. See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, The Paradox of 
Bill of Rights Rhetoric, 1787-1791, in Josephine F. Pacheco, ed., To Secure the Blessings of 
Liberty: Rights in American History 83,85 (George Mason U. Press, 1993). On this score, 
the Federalists' vision has largely been achieved. Federal military, fiscal, regulatory, and 
enforcement powers are capable of imposing serious restraints on state actions. It would 
be wrong to assume uncritically that all exercises of such powers have been consistent 
with constitutional ideals, but it would equally wrong to deny that federal coercive powers 
have often been used to uphold the Constitution. Compare, for example, the United 
States military's treatment of persons of Japanese ancestry during World War II with 
President Eisenhower's use of national troops to enforce desegregation in the aftermath 
of Brown v. Board of Education. 
It is less clear that the states have had adequate means, in practice, of protecting their 
separately reserved powers. According to Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), representative processes are adequate to protect state 
powers from federal abridgement. See also Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of 
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Gov-
ernment, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543 (1954). Some members of the Supreme Court have been 
unwilling, however, to assume that ordinary representative processes are adequate to pro-
tect state prerogatives. In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), for 
example, Chief Justice Rehnquist compared the states' reserved powers to rights of the 
people that judges were authorized to enforce as limitations on federal powers. New York 
v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992), represents a renewed effort by judges to safeguard 
principles of federalism. Without denying the importance of these precedents, the thrust 
of this article is that persons should not equate constitutional limitations with those en-
forced by judges. 
81. The Civil War is a reminder of the extremes to which individuals and public 
officials may go when seeking to preserve or establish their normative visions. Constitu-
tional disputes are typically resolved in a more orderly manner, though not necessarily 
without the use of force. See generally Robert M. Cover, The Bonds of Constitutional 
Interpretation: Of the Word, the Deed, and the Role, 20 Ga. L. Rev. 815 (1986), for analysis 
of coercive dimensions of legal decision making. 
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with them, even in the face of opposition, is a sign of constitu-
tional commitment that deserves commendation, not 
repudiation.s2 
Extending principles of interpretive autonomy to embrace 
the states' independently interpreting and exercising their re-
served powers depends, of course, on an assumption that the 
Constitution reserves some powers to the states, acting sepa-
rately. In addition, there are questions about who may legiti-
mately claim to act on behalf of a state by exercising powers 
purportedly reserved to it. These issues also deserve further 
consideration. 
B 
The Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions based arguments for 
state autonomy, including diffused interpretive powers, on a 
premise that the Constitution was a "compact" among sovereign 
states. That premise was controversial even in its time. But the 
basic principles underlying these arguments remain viable: fed-
eral officials depend on affirmative delegations of power, and 
those delegations are limited in scope. 
H. Jefferson Powell recently criticized the Kentucky and Vir-
ginia Resolutions for ignoring arguments during the founding pe-
riod that the Constitution would not constitute a "compact." As 
Powell explained, James Wilson and others had argued that "this 
system is not a compact or contract; the system itself tells you 
what it is; it is an ordinance and establishment of the people."s3 
According to Powell, "[t]he [Kentucky and Virginia] Resolutions 
simply ignored the recent and well-known debates over the Con-
stitution's character, as well as the absence within its text of ref-
erences to a compact or to the states as sovereign contracting 
parties."84 Powell also contrasted Jeffersonian positions on the 
Constitution's character with arguments by John Marshall and 
82. The Constitution imposes constraints on how governmental officials may seek to 
vindicate constitutional norms; and there are corresponding legal limitations on the 
means available to individuals. For example, governmental officials are obliged to respect 
principles of due process, and individuals are likewise obliged to respect laws against 
harming persons, property, and the like. Adding further complication, various actions 
have differing effects in supporting or undercutting respect for legal institutions and the 
Constitution itself. 
83. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 Harv. L. 
Rev. 885, 930 & n.237 (1985) (citing James Wilson's remarks at the Pennsylvania Ratify-
ing Convention on December 11, 1787). These remarks are reprinted by Merrill Jensen, 
ed., 2 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 556 (State Histori-
cal Society of Wisconsin, 1976). 
84. Powell, 98 Harv. L. Rev. at 930 (cited in note 83). 
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others who subsequently emphasized principles of national 
supremacy.s5 
It is important not to overstate the differences between Jef-
ferson's and Madison's reliance on the idea of a constitutional 
"compact" and Wilson's repudiation of contractual analogies 
during the founding period. Wilson argued that the proposed 
Constitution would form neither a compact among state govern-
ments nor a contract between the people and governmental insti-
tutions. Instead, he relied on the preamble and emphasized the 
constitutional design's dependence on the people's foundational 
political authority, including the people's authority to recall at 
any time powers previously delegated by them to state govern-
mental institutions. He likewise argued that the people would 
continue to hold all sovereign powers after the proposed Consti-
tution's ratification: "Those who ordain and establish have the 
power, if they think proper, to repeal and annul."s6 
Wilson linked these arguments to claims that the Constitu-
tion would delegate limited powers. He took a position that the 
proposed Constitution, .unlike state constitutions, was structured 
to limit federal officials to exercising enumerated powers. For 
this reason, he argued that there was no need to enumerate rights 
in the proposed constitutional text.87 
He relied on this premise to deny that the federal Constitu-
tion would annihilate state governments. He claimed that the 
people, by approving the Constitution, would transfer some but 
not all governmental powers from state to federal institutions: 
When the principle is once settled, that the people are the 
source of authority, the consequence is, that they may take 
from the subordinate governments powers with which they 
have hitherto trusted them, and place those powers in the gen-
eral government, if it is thought that there they will be produc-
tive of more good. They can distribute one portion of power 
to the more contracted circle called state governments; they 
85. ld. at 930, 942-48 (cited in note 83). Powell's article focused on historical con-
ceptions of the Constitution's "intent," not interpretive prerogatives. 
86. See the account of Wilson's remarks at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, 
as reprinted by Jensen, ed., 2 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitu-
tion at 356-63 (Nov. 24, 1787, as reported by Thomas Lloyd) (cited in note 83); id. at 382-
84 (Nov. 28, 1787); id. at 554-58 (Dec. 11, 1787). See also id. at 383 ("[H]ere, sir, the fee 
simple remains in the people at large, and, by this Constitution, they do not part with it."); 
id. at 362 ("[T]he people may change the constitutions whenever and however they 
please."). 
87. See id. at 387-89 (Nov. 28, 1787). 
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can also furnish another proportion to the government of the 
United States.ss 
He assumed, moreover, that even after the federal Constitution's 
ratification, state officials would hold all governmental powers 
not delegated to the federal government. In this connection, sig-
nificantly, he referred to the party giving up powers to the fed-
eral government (in his terms, a "confederate republic," or the 
"national government") as "the states": 
When a confederate republic is instituted, the communities, of 
which it is composed, surrender to it a part of their political 
independence, which they before enjoyed as states . ... The 
states should resign, to the national government, that part, and 
that part only, of their political liberty, which placed in that 
government will produce more good to the whole than if it had 
remained in the several states.B9 
Finally, he presumed that "[s]ince states as well as citizens are 
represented in the Constitution before us, and form the objects 
on which that Constitution is proposed to operate, it was neces-
sary to notice and define federal as well as civil liberty."90 As 
would Madison, he referred to "the states" as political communi-
ties, not just as the governmental institutions representing those 
communities. 
For good reasons, Wilson avoided the rhetoric of "com-
pacts." But his analysis could have been coherently recast as 
flowing from assumptions that "the people" formed "compacts" 
among themselves, both as members of states and as members of 
the United States, and in those capacities delegated governmen-
tal powers to institutions at both levels.9t Whether individuals 
88. Id. at 449 (Dec. 1, 1787). See also id. at 496 (Dec. 4, 1787) (characterized federal 
and state powers as divided by an imprecise "line"). 
89. Id. at 359 (Nov. 24, 1787) (emphasis added). 
90. Id. (emphasis in original). 
91. In Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 471 (1793), Chief Justice John Jay 
characterized the Constitution as a "compact" among "the people": 
Every State constitution is a compact made by and between the citizens of a 
State to govern themselves in a certain manner; and the Constitution of the 
United States is likewise a compact made by the people of the United States to 
govern themselves as to general objects, in a certain matter. 
Significantly, Jay was a leading Federalist from New York. In a letter to N.P. Trist dated 
February 15, 1830, Madison explained: 
Although the old idea of a compact between the Government & the people 
be justly exploded, the idea of a compact among those who are parties to a 
Government is a fundamental principle of free Government. 
The original compact is the one implied or presumed, but nowhere reduced 
to writing, by which a people agree to form one society. The next is a compact, 
here for the first time reduced to writing, by which the people in their social 
state agree to a Government over them. These two compacts may be considered 
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and states were bound by a particular federal action thus hinged, 
in his view, on whether power to perform that action had been 
"surrendered" (even if only tentatively) by them through the 
Constitution's adoption. 
Thus there was substantial overlap among Wilson's argu-
ments and those presented in the Kentucky and Virginia Resolu-
tions. Each depended on an assumption that the Constitution 
delegated limited powers to institutions of federal government. 
Each claimed that the Constitution also reserved powers to the 
respective states and contemplated their exercising these powers 
separately. Each assumed that the states would be bound by fed-
eral actions within the scope of delegated powers but not outside 
them. 
Wilson placed greater emphasis on the authority of "the 
people," joined as members of a national political community 
and not just as members of states. Thus he identified important 
problems with arguments that the Constitution was fundamen-
tally a compact among states. He emphasized how the people at 
large, not just the states as such, were constituents. 
Even so, many of Wilson's arguments were consistent with 
affirming some forms of state interpretive autonomy. He argued 
that "the people" had divided governmental powers among fed-
eral and state institutions. There was no need to assume that the 
people, acting through the Constitution, had withheld all inter-
pretive powers from the latter institutions. On the contrary, his 
claim that the Constitution divided governmental powers pro-
vided foundations for arguments that it also gave the respective 
institutions adequate means for exercising those powers. Rather 
than leading to a conclusion that state officials should have 
treated federal officials as ultimate interpreters, the concept of 
popular sovereignty could accommodate arguments that state of-
ficials should have subordinated their exercises of power to the 
superior will of the people, as expressed in the Constitution itself. 
c 
There remain serious questions about how "the people" 
have been politically constituted and how they may authorita-
tively act. The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions presumed that 
"the people" were constituted at least in part as members of 
states. The Resolutions also assumed that "the people" of a state 
as blended in the Constitution of the U.S., which recognises a union or society of 
States, and makes it the basis of the Government formed by the parties to it. 
9 Writings of James Madison at 355n. (cited in note 8). 
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could act, at least in some contexts and for some purposes, 
through state legislatures. Article VII supports a similar position 
by contemplating actions by the people of the respective states 
through conventions, and Article I gave state legislatures author-
ity to act on behalf of the states for purposes of choosing sena-
tors. Article V also attaches significance to actions by the people 
of the states, acting through conventions or state legislatures, as a 
predicate to amending the constitutional text. 
The preamble supports arguments, however, that "the peo-
ple" are constituted not only as members of states. It purports to 
rest the Constitution's authority on "the People of the United 
States." When read with Article VII, moreover, the preamble 
implies that concurrent actions by conventions among the states 
would constitute an authoritative action of this more-inclusive 
"people." Article V also makes national action, by Congress or a 
national convention, a predicate to amending the constitutional 
text. In addition, Articles I, II and III authorize federal officials 
to act on behalf of "the People of the United States" within pre-
scribed limits. 
It appears, therefore, that the Constitution presupposes that 
"the people" have at least two identities: as members of states 
and as members of the United States.92 The preamble and Arti-
cles V and VII indicate that some forms of formal constitutional 
change depend on concurrent actions by "the people," acting in 
both capacities (national and state, through legislatures and/or 
conventions). Pending such change, the Constitution subordi-
nates ordinary governmental actions, by federal and state offi-
cials, to its own imperatives. 
These assumptions have not become obsolete. The Consti-
tution has withdrawn some powers from the states, placed addi-
tional limitations on powers not withdrawn, and delegated new 
powers to Congress and other federal institutions. But the ideas 
of limited federal powers and separately reserved state powers 
remain viable. 
The Fourteenth Amendment's definition of citizenship also 
supports rather than undercuts arguments that "the people" re-
main constituted both as members of states and as members of 
92. For purposes of this essay, it is not necessary to identify or examine other forms 
of popular identity, including the Constitution's assumption that "the people" were con-
stituted in part as separate individuals and as members of groups other than "the states" 
and "the United States." One of the main issues raised by the Alien and Sedition Acts, of 
course, was whether the First Amendment protected areas of individual autonomy for the 
benefit of "the people" as individuals and members of political parties and other non· 
governmental associations, not just as members of states. 
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the United States. Section 1 defines "persons born or natural-
ized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof" 
as "citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside." This Amendment changed the composition of "the peo-
ple" by expanding formal citizenship, but it did not eliminate 
dual citizenship: national and state. As with other parts of the 
Constitution, these provisions contemplate the people's continu-
ing to act not only as members of a national polity and through 
institutions of federal government, but also as members of states 
and through institutions of state government. 
It is difficult to deny that there have been legitimate shifts in 
power from the states to the federal government. As a result, the 
narrow conceptions of federal authority presented in the Ken-
tucky and Virginia Resolutions have become, in a sense, out-
dated. Expanding federal powers have had wide-reaching 
normative implications-with effects, among other things, on the 
attributes (as well as scope) of national and state citizenship. 
Arguments for state interpretive autonomy remain severa-
ble, however, from conclusions regarding the scope of federal 
and state governmental powers and their respective relationships 
to rights and powers of "the people," variously conceived. As 
long as the Constitution preserves the states as autonomous 
political units that have distinguishable reserved powers, the idea 
of corresponding interpretive prerogatives remains coherent. 
The constitutional design continues to allow state officials and 
the people of the respective states to play important roles not 
only in ratifying formal amendments but also in exercising other 
rights and powers in ways that shape political discourse.93 
It would be anomalous, indeed, to claim that state action is a 
prerequisite to formally amending the constitutional text but 
does not count for purposes of ascertaining the meaning of that 
text.94 It is more coherent to attribute to the states important 
93. It is important to pay attention to how a variety of state officials, not just legisla-
tors, may act on behalf of the people of a state. This issue is especially important since 
there is increasing diversity among the people of the respective states (which is also a 
more inclusive category, as a matter of federal constitutional law, than during the found-
ing period). 
94. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 Yale L.J. 
453 (1989), and Ackerman, We The People: Foundations (Belknap Press, 1991), for argu-
ments that the Constitution allows for authoritative change through informal means that 
go beyond those authorized by Article V. His arguments overlap, to some extent, my 
presuppositions regarding the possibility of authoritative interpretive change. But Acker· 
man seems more willing than I to regard state participation in interpretive change as 
capable of being displaced by forms of national action. See also Akhil Reed Amar, Phi/a· 
delphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1043 
(1988). Amar considers whether "the people" may legitimately amend the Constitution 
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roles not only in changing the constitutional text, but also in sus-
taining and otherwise recreating fundamental law through inter-
pretive dialogue. 
CONCLUSION 
A move beyond excessive preoccupation with the Constitu-
tion's judicial interpretation and enforcement is necessary to 
place in perspective various efforts to deal with current political 
dilemmas. It would be wrong, for example, to look to one person 
or institution to resolve finally controversies over the constitu-
tional validity of health care reform, educational initiatives, envi-
ronmental policies, changes in criminal and civil laws, or efforts 
to protect or limit reproductive choices. Instead, there are good 
reasons for interpreting the Constitution as contemplating far-
reaching dialogue on the important issues of the day. There are 
also good reasons for affirming, rather than undercutting, com-
mitment to constitutional ideals even in the face of their popular 
denial or official disregard. 
Accordingly, constitutional theory and practice should be 
expanded to embrace the core principles of state interpretive au-
tonomy that are common to the Kentucky and Virginia Resolu-
tions. Although the states acting separately may pose serious 
threats to principles of American constitutionalism, cutting off 
the states' contributions to interpretive dialogue would threaten 
more directly the Constitution itself. Commitment by state offi-
cials to constitutional norms, like affirmation of the Constitu-
tion's meaning and authority by members of the people at large, 
deserves commendation rather than repudiation. There are rea-
sons for concern, not celebration, should state officials and the 
people of the states lose the capacity to interpret and exercise 
their powers independently of federal officials.9s 
through popular referenda or other means in addition to those contemplated by Article 
V. For analysis of several models of representation and their consistency with delibera-
tive ideals, see James S. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Demo-
cratic Reform (Yale U. Press, 1991). 
95. Even if one is only (or primarily) concerned about the ability of the people to 
sustain principles of American constitutionalism, there are reasons for paying attention to 
the roles of states in fostering popular political participation. See generally Symposium: 
The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 Yale L.J. 1493-1723 (1988); Symposium: Roads Not 
Taken: Undercurrents of Republican Thinking in Modem Constitutional Theory, 84 Nw. 
U. L. Rev. 1-249 (1989); Sheldon S. Wolin, The People's Two Bodies, 1 democracy 9 
(1981). 
